On November 7th at 12pm at Temple University School of Law, I will be making a presentation entitled Kill-Lists and Accountability, based on my identically titled paper. The abstract of the paper appears below:
This paper examines the U.S. practice of targeted killings. It proceeds in two parts, the first part is an empirical description of the process of targeted killings. Based on qualitative empirical research conducted pursuant to proven case study techniques, part one describes how kill-lists are created, what government actors approve the name of individuals to be added to kill lists, how targeted killings are executed, and how the U.S. implements its International Humanitarian Law obligation to mitigate and prevent harm to civilians.
Specifically, the paper explains in rich detail the process the U.S. follows to estimate and mitigate the impact of conventional weapons on collateral persons and objects in most targeted killings. Key Findings: In pre-planned operations the U.S. follows a rigorous collateral damage estimation process based on a progressively refined analysis of intelligence, weapon effects, and other information. When followed, this process dramatically reduces the amount of collateral damage in U.S. operations, and also ensures high levels of political accountability. However, due to the realities of combat operations, the process cannot always be followed; Data about the U.S. military’s collateral damage estimation process reveals that the system is intended to ensure that there will be a less than 10 percent probability of serious or lethal wounds to non-combatants; In actuality, less than 1% of pre-planned operations that followed the collateral damage estimation process resulted in collateral damage; When collateral damage has occurred, 70% of the time it was due to failed “positive identification” of a target. 22% of the time it was attributable to weapons malfunction, and a mere 8% of the time it was attributable to proportionality balancing – e.g. a conscious decision that anticipated military advantage outweighed collateral damage; According to public statements made by U.S. government officials the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense must approve any pre-planned ISAF strike where 1 civilian casualty or greater is expected.
In the second part of the paper, I turn from the empirical to the normative. I describe the various mechanisms of accountability embedded in the targeted killing process. Specifically, I set forth an analytical framework which allows for the examination of legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional mechanisms of accountability. I then assess the strengths and weaknesses of these four accountability mechanisms as applied to U.S. targeted killings. The paper concludes by suggesting legal and policy reforms to address the shortcomings identified in the normative section.
In an act of sheer idiocy, Mayor Michael Bloomberg decided that the New York City Marathon should still be held, despite the fact that the city is struggling to recover from “Superstorm Sandy.” We’re talking about a city where children are dumpster diving for food, but somehow Mayor Bloomberg thinks an event where out of town runners trot through the city while they are handed free bananas, energy bars and water is a good idea?
A marathon, while Staten Island Borough President James Molinaro is pleading for help from the Red Cross and other volunteer organizations. Where are the volunteers? Well, they are descending on New York City for a race that has been described in ordinary times as a “grueling feat of logistics.” It’s an event that requires dozens of medical volunteers to tend to runners and hundreds of police to close roads and direct traffic.
Aren’t these the exact people we want focused on the victims of Sandy?
How can this sporting event possibly be the right thing for the people of New York?
On Thursday November 1st, at 12 noon I will be making a presentation entitled Drones on the Homefront: Privacy at Risk? This presentation is based on my paper Drones and Privacy Governance, a short abstract of that paper appears below.
Unmanned systems (drones) and other technological innovations raise serious questions about modern conceptions of privacy. This paper examines the constitutional doctrine related to aerial surveillance and technology, and finds that current doctrine is unlikely to prevent the use of unmanned systems. The paper next addresses calls to create a statutory requirement that will subject the use of unmanned systems to the warrant requirement. These calls are rejected because they fail to protect privacy, while unnecessarily hampering legitimate law enforcement efforts. To best protect privacy, the paper suggests various mechanisms of democratically centered privacy governance, and a regulatory regime to govern the use of unmanned systems. The paper’s appendix includes a model bill appropriate for adoption by cities, states, and the federal government. The bill outlines the various privacy governance measures discussed in the body of the paper.
On November 4th at 4pm at Seattle University School of Law, I will be making a presentation entitled Kill-Lists and Accountability, based on my identically titled paper. The abstract of the paper appears below:
This paper examines the U.S. practice of targeted killings. It proceeds in two parts, the first part is an empirical description of the process of targeted killings. Based on qualitative empirical research conducted pursuant to proven case study techniques, part one describes how kill-lists are created, what government actors approve the name of individuals to be added to kill lists, how targeted killings are executed, and how the U.S. implements its International Humanitarian Law obligation to mitigate and prevent harm to civilians.
Specifically, the paper explains in rich detail the process the U.S. follows to estimate and mitigate the impact of conventional weapons on collateral persons and objects in most targeted killings. Key Findings: In pre-planned operations the U.S. follows a rigorous collateral damage estimation process based on a progressively refined analysis of intelligence, weapon effects, and other information. When followed, this process dramatically reduces the amount of collateral damage in U.S. operations, and also ensures high levels of political accountability. However, due to the realities of combat operations, the process cannot always be followed; Data about the U.S. military’s collateral damage estimation process reveals that the system is intended to ensure that there will be a less than 10 percent probability of serious or lethal wounds to non-combatants; In actuality, less than 1% of pre-planned operations that followed the collateral damage estimation process resulted in collateral damage; When collateral damage has occurred, 70% of the time it was due to failed “positive identification” of a target. 22% of the time it was attributable to weapons malfunction, and a mere 8% of the time it was attributable to proportionality balancing – e.g. a conscious decision that anticipated military advantage outweighed collateral damage; According to public statements made by U.S. government officials the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense must approve any pre-planned ISAF strike where 1 civilian casualty or greater is expected.
In the second part of the paper, I turn from the empirical to the normative. I describe the various mechanisms of accountability embedded in the targeted killing process. Specifically, I set forth an analytical framework which allows for the examination of legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional mechanisms of accountability. I then assess the strengths and weaknesses of these four accountability mechanisms as applied to U.S. targeted killings. The paper concludes by suggesting legal and policy reforms to address the shortcomings identified in the normative section.
On October 17th at South Texas College of Law I will be making a presentation entitled Kill-Lists and Accountability, based on my identically titled paper. The abstract of the paper appears below:
This paper examines the U.S. practice of targeted killings. It proceeds in two parts, the first part is an empirical description of the process of targeted killings. Based on qualitative empirical research conducted pursuant to proven case study techniques, part one describes how kill-lists are created, what government actors approve the name of individuals to be added to kill lists, how targeted killings are executed, and how the U.S. implements its International Humanitarian Law obligation to mitigate and prevent harm to civilians.
Specifically, the paper explains in rich detail the process the U.S. follows to estimate and mitigate the impact of conventional weapons on collateral persons and objects in most targeted killings. Key Findings: In pre-planned operations the U.S. follows a rigorous collateral damage estimation process based on a progressively refined analysis of intelligence, weapon effects, and other information. When followed, this process dramatically reduces the amount of collateral damage in U.S. operations, and also ensures high levels of political accountability. However, due to the realities of combat operations, the process cannot always be followed; Data about the U.S. military’s collateral damage estimation process reveals that the system is intended to ensure that there will be a less than 10 percent probability of serious or lethal wounds to non-combatants; In actuality, less than 1% of pre-planned operations that followed the collateral damage estimation process resulted in collateral damage; When collateral damage has occurred, 70% of the time it was due to failed “positive identification” of a target. 22% of the time it was attributable to weapons malfunction, and a mere 8% of the time it was attributable to proportionality balancing – e.g. a conscious decision that anticipated military advantage outweighed collateral damage; According to public statements made by U.S. government officials the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense must approve any pre-planned ISAF strike where 1 civilian casualty or greater is expected.
In the second part of the paper, I turn from the empirical to the normative. I describe the various mechanisms of accountability embedded in the targeted killing process. Specifically, I set forth an analytical framework which allows for the examination of legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional mechanisms of accountability. I then assess the strengths and weaknesses of these four accountability mechanisms as applied to U.S. targeted killings. The paper concludes by suggesting legal and policy reforms to address the shortcomings identified in the normative section.
On Thursday October 11th at 12pm I will be making a presentation based on my paper Drones and Privacy Governance. The event will be open to the public and refreshments will be served.
Here is the abstract of my paper:
Unmanned systems (drones) and other technological innovations raise serious questions about modern conceptions of privacy. This paper examines the constitutional doctrine related to aerial surveillance and technology, and finds that current doctrine is unlikely to prevent the use of unmanned systems. The paper next addresses calls to create a statutory requirement that will subject the use of unmanned systems to the warrant requirement. These calls are rejected because they fail to protect privacy, while unnecessarily hampering legitimate law enforcement efforts. To best protect privacy, the paper suggests various mechanisms of democratically centered privacy governance, and a regulatory regime to govern the use of unmanned systems. The paper’s appendix includes a model bill appropriate for adoption by cities, states, and the federal government. The bill outlines the various privacy governance measures discussed in the body of the paper.
On Thursday October 4th at 12pm I will be making a presentation based on my paper Drones and Privacy Governance. The event will be open to the public and refreshments will be served.
Here is the abstract of my paper:
Unmanned systems (drones) and other technological innovations raise serious questions about modern conceptions of privacy. This paper examines the constitutional doctrine related to aerial surveillance and technology, and finds that current doctrine is unlikely to prevent the use of unmanned systems. The paper next addresses calls to create a statutory requirement that will subject the use of unmanned systems to the warrant requirement. These calls are rejected because they fail to protect privacy, while unnecessarily hampering legitimate law enforcement efforts. To best protect privacy, the paper suggests various mechanisms of democratically centered privacy governance, and a regulatory regime to govern the use of unmanned systems. The paper’s appendix includes a model bill appropriate for adoption by cities, states, and the federal government. The bill outlines the various privacy governance measures discussed in the body of the paper.
Emerging Trends in Modern Warfare Conference
The Emerging Trends in Modern Warfare conference will consist of two panels discussing different changes that are happening in the ways the United States military operates. The first panel focuses on the practical operational considerations that are necessary when people from the military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities work together and how this convergence is actually working in the field. The second panel focuses on the Constitutional, International Humanitarian Law, and Law of Armed Conflict issues that arise when these components operate together overseas.
When
Sept. 21, 2012 from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. Registration begins at 8:30 a.m.
Where
Seminar rooms 4 and 5 (S-4 and S-5). University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law 3200 Fifth Ave. Sacramento, CA 95817 Map & Directions
Cost
- General Admission — $20
- MCLE Credit (Pacific McGeorge Alumni) — $25
- MCLE Credit (non-Alumni) — $40
- Students and Pacific McGeorge Faculty — Free
- Register & Pay
Contact
For more information, please call 916.739.7138 or send an email to mlsatmcgeorge@pacific.edu.
Program
| 8:30 to 9 a.m. | Breakfast & Registration |
| 9:15 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. | Opening Remarks |
| 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m | Panel 1: The Operational Convergence Between the Military, the Intelligence Community, and Law Enforcement
|
| 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. | Lunch |
| 12:45 p.m. to 2:45 p.m. | Panel 2: Constitutional and International Legal Challenges Related to Modern Warfare Tactics, Technology, and Practices
|
| 2:45 p.m. to 3 p.m. | Closing Remarks |
“A Debate on the Legal Authority of Drone Killing and the Presidential Kill List”
Is killing by drone lawful? What about kill-lists created by the President? On Monday, September 17th at Pepperdine University School of Law, I will be debating these and related questions with Professor Michael Lewis of Ohio Northern University.
The flier, created by the student chapter of The Federalist Society appears below with relevant details:
For more on this issue, see my article Kill-Lists and Accountability.
I’m pleased to announce that I will be serving in a leadership capacity in the American Society of International Law’s new interest group, the International Law and Technology Interest Group (ILTechIG), which will focus on the implications of technological advances across a range of international law disciplines. The group is co-chaired by Molly Land and Anupam Chander, with (me) Greg McNeal serving as the Secretary/Treasurer. To join this interest group, log in at asil.org, click on “Interest Groups” (left navigation bar), select the “All Interest Groups” tab, go to page 3, and click on “Join Group” next to ILTechIG. If you have any questions about the group or need your login information, please contact ASIL Services here or by calling +1.202.939.6001.
